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By Mitchell M. Gans, Jonathan G.Blattmachr, and Diana S.C.Zeydel
designed to avoid estate tax on the death of the
first
any married
adopt an
estate plan
spouse toindividuals
die while taking
maximum
advantage of the so-called unified credit (also known as
the applicable exclusion amount). The plan typically
involves setting apart the amount sheltered by the unified credit (the "credit shelter" amount) separately and
providing that only the portion of the estate in excess of
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the credit shelter amount will pass in a manner that
qualifies for the marital deduction. Frequently, the credit
shelter amount is set apart in trust so that the surviving
spouse may benefit from the property if needed without
causing those assets to be included in the surviving
spouse's estate for estate tax purposes. A credit shelter
trust not only preserves the unified credit of the first
spouse to die but also provides an opportunity to leverage the unified credit of the first spouse to die during
the lifetime of the surviving spouse: to the extent there is
appreciation and/or accumulated income in the trust, it
passes on the surviving spouse's death free of estate tax
(and free of generation-skipping transfer tax, assuming
an allocation of GST exemption to the trust). The amount
in the trust passing tax-free at the surviving spouse's
death is enhanced, of course, if trust distributions to the
surviving spouse are minimized. The amount in the trust
would be further enhanced if the credit shelter trust
were the surviving spouse's grantor trust: the surviving
spouse's payment of tax on the trust's income would
permit the trust estate to grow income tax free. The trust,
in other words, would be supercharged. This article will
suggest that a lifetime QTIP trust should be used to
supercharge the credit shelter trust. Given the advantage

offered by the Supercharged Credit
Shelter TrustsM, practitioners may
wish to consider adopting this drafting approach in many cases.

unified credit (that is, the unused
exemption) from estate tax in this
fashion, it is commonly referred to as a
"credit shelter trust."

Background
The unified credit is typically conceptualized as a federal estate tax exemption
or exemption equivalent. The exemption has increased from $60,000 (when
it was a true exemption) for many
years before 1977 to the current
amount of $2 million (and it increases
in 2009 to $3.5 million). Under current
law, there is no federal estate tax in
2010 (so one could view the exemption
as unlimited for that year). After 2010,
the exemption would revert to $1 million. See section 2010 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 as amended
("Code").
In a conventional plan, the first
spouse to die does not bequeath all of
his or her assets to the surviving
spouse via a bequest or other disposition that qualifies for the marital
deduction. Were such an approach
used, the first spouse's exemption
would be wasted. Rather, the exemption amount is typically bequeathed in
trust, with the surviving spouse as a
beneficiary. As long as the surviving
spouse is not given a general power of
appointment, its assets will be excluded from the surviving spouse's gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes.

Structure and Benefits of the
Credit Shelter Trust
Some clients may insist on mandating
distributions of trust income to the surviving spouse from the credit shelter
trust. Although that may provide a
sense of psychological and economic
security, it is inefficient from a tax
viewpoint. Amounts distributed to the
surviving spouse, to the extent not
expended, will have the effect of
increasing his or her gross estate,
whereas amounts accumulated in the
trust will pass, as indicated, free of
estate tax at the surviving spouse's
death. In addition, distributions to the
surviving spouse will have the effect of
depleting a tax-exempt trust when it
might be possible to provide for the
spouse out of what would be estate
taxable assets. Moreover, during the
surviving spouse's lifetime, income
could be distributed to descendants
without incurring gift tax. For example,
if the trust mandated income distributions to the surviving spouse and he or
she then gifted the income received to
a child, a taxable gift would occur (to
the extent not protected by the annual
exclusion under Code § 2503). But, if
authorized in the instrument, the
income could be distributed by a disinterested trustee directly to the child
without generating a taxable gift. (An
interested trustee, one who is a beneficiary of the trust, could also make the
distribution without generating a taxable gift if the trust instrument permits
distributions to be made in accordance
with an ascertainable standard, such as
health, maintenance, support, and education.) In addition, the income distribution to the child might produce
income tax savings: the distribution
should be taxable for income tax purposes to the child, and, if the child is in
a lower income tax bracket than the
surviving spouse, the difference in
bracket will result in savings. Even if
the income is accumulated in the trust,
savings may be achieved: whereas a
distribution to the spouse could gener-

Credit Shelter Trusts
Typically, the plan designed fully to
use the exemption of the first spouse
to die is implemented through a "formula" bequest, under which an
amount equal to the spouse's unused
federal estate tax exemption is placed
in a trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse and descendants. The trust
shelters the assets used to fund the
exemption from inclusion in the surviving spouse's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes: neither Code
§ 2036 nor Code § 2038 can apply
because the surviving spouse makes
no transfer to the trust; and, if properly drafted, the surviving spouse does
not have a general power of appointment over trust assets. Because the
trust shelters the amount based on the

ate state or local income tax, it is possible that the trust might not be subject
to such a tax.
When the surviving spouse has sufficient resources, he or she should not
receive distributions from the trust. In
other words, to achieve an optimal tax
outcome for the entire family, the surviving spouse should expend his or her
own assets (or those in the marital
deduction trust) rather than receive
distributions from the credit shelter
trust. To illustrate, assume that the surviving spouse has access to the following categories of assets: assets held outright by the surviving spouse, assets
held in the credit shelter trust, and
assets held in one or more marital
deduction trusts. Because only the
assets held in the credit shelter trust
will pass estate tax free at the surviving
spouse's death, it would be preferable
to use principal in the marital deduction trust (as it is generally the case that
the marital deduction trust will mandate income distributions), rather than
principal or income in the credit shelter
trust, to enable the surviving spouse to
maintain an appropriate standard of
living. Under this approach, the assets
in the marital deduction trust (estate
taxable when the surviving spouse
dies) "vanish" while the assets in the
credit shelter trust (not estate taxable
when the surviving spouse dies) grow.
This can be accomplished if the trustee
is authorized to distribute principal
from the marital deduction trust(s) to
the surviving spouse and to accumulate income in the credit shelter trust
(in addition, as suggested, it may be
helpful from a planning perspective if
the trustee of the credit shelter trust
were authorized to make distributions
to descendants). When it is anticipated
that the credit shelter and marital
deduction trusts will be so administered, it may be appropriate to provide
detailed authorization to the trustees
and, indeed, to encourage them to use
this approach. A sample provision
might read as follows:
Estate Tax Efficient Shares
I have provided in this instrument,
if my spouse survives me, for my
estate to be divided into what I per-
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ceive to be estate tax efficient shares
for those who may succeed to property disposed of hereunder upon the
death of my spouse. I understand
that the relative size of those shares is
dependent upon the tax law in effect
at the time of my death and upon
elections or other decisions made by
my executors/personal representatives. I acknowledge that the interest
of my spouse in the shares created
hereunder may not be the same and
that, if there is no death tax in effect
at the time of my death, no estate tax
marital deduction share may be created for my spouse. Because benefiting my spouse is one of my primary
concerns, I request, but do not direct,
that the Trustees of any trust hereunder in which my spouse has an interest benefit my spouse therefrom in a
manner that will eliminate or minimize the economic effect upon my
spouse of the division of property
into separate shares; provided, however, that only a Trustee other than
any Trustee who is or in the future
may become a beneficiary of a trust
hereunder who is referred to herein
as an "Interested Trustee" shall participate in any such decision. Without
limiting the discretion granted to the
Trustees hereunder, without granting
my spouse any right to compel the
Trustees to do so, and without
imposing any obligation for the
Trustees to do so, and solely by way
of illustration and not limitation, I
authorize the Trustees (other than
any Interested Trustee) to pay principal to my spouse from any trust that
qualifies for the Federal and/or state
estate tax marital deduction while
accumulating income in any other
trust in which my spouse may have
an interest in a manner that the
Trustees (other than any Interested
Trustee) determine may provide my
spouse with approximately the same
net benefit (taking into account
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income taxes and any other factors
the Trustees (other than any
Interested Trustee) deem appropriate) my spouse would have received
had all income or a reasonable unitrust amount, as determined by the
Trustees (other than any Interested
Trustee), from all trusts in which my
spouse has an interest hereunder
been paid to my spouse.
Supercharging the Credit
Shelter Trust
As suggested, in a conventional plan
the credit shelter trust is created by
bequest. Under subchapter J of the
Code's income tax provisions, unless
the trust is a grantor trust under subpart E of part 1 of subchapter J, the
income taxation of a trust's income is
based on the concept of distributable
net income (DNI). Under those DNI
rules, the trust's income is taxable to
the beneficiaries or the trust depending
on the amount of distributions made
each year. See Code §§ 651-662. Thus,
if income distributions to the surviving
spouse are mandated or made in the
discretion of the trustee, they will be
taxed under the DNI rules to the
spouse, as a general rule. If, on the
other hand, the trust's income is either
accumulated or distributed to descendants, it will, of course, not be taxed to
the spouse. Suppose, however, the DNI
rules could be displaced with the
grantor trust rules so that the trust's
income, therefore, would be made taxable to the spouse even if no distributions are made to the spouse. (Under
the grantor trust rules, the income,
deductions, and credits against tax of
the trust are attributed directly to the
grantor as though the trust does not
exist and the trust assets were owned
directly by the grantor.) If this could be
accomplished, the trust would grow
income tax free and thus, in effect,
would be enhanced by the spouse's
income tax payments. And, assuming
an allocation of GST (generation-skipping tax) exemption were made to the
trust, the enhancement attributable to
the spouse's payment of the income tax
- could inure to the benefit of lower-gen-
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eration beneficiaries on a completely
transfer-tax-free basis. The credit shelter trust would thus become "supercharged."
How might one structure a credit
shelter trust to supercharge it? At bottom, the concept rests on Rev. Rul.
2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7. In the ruling, the
IRS considered the gift tax implications
of a grantor trust. In the case of a
grantor trust, the DNI rules do not
apply. Instead, the trust is ignored for
income tax purposes and its income is
taxed to the grantor. See Rev. Rul. 8513, 1985-1 C.B. 184. In Rev. Rul. 2004-64,
the IRS concluded that the grantor's
payment of the tax on the income of a
grantor trust does not constitute a taxable gift. For a discussion of the ruling,
see M. Gans, S. Heilborn & J.
Blattmachr, Some Good News About
Grantor Trusts: Rev. Rul. 2004-64,31 Est.
Plan. No. 10, at 467 (Oct. 2004). Thus, if
a credit shelter trust could be structured so that it was the surviving
spouse's grantor trust for income tax
purposes while still functioning as a
credit shelter trust for transfer-tax purposes (no inclusion in the surviving
spouse's estate), it would be supercharged.
The difficulty, however, is that,
under conventional planning, the surviving spouse is not the grantor of the
credit shelter trust. The trust is created
by bequest under the will (or revocable
trust) of the first spouse to die and,
therefore, cannot be viewed as the surviving spouse's grantor trust.
Nonetheless, under Code § 678, the
trust could qualify as the surviving
spouse's grantor trust if he or she were
given the right to withdraw the trust
principal. Although this would be
effective in terms of making the trust's
income taxable to the spouse, it would
be ineffective in terms of the estate tax:
such a withdrawal power is a general
power of appointment that would
cause the trust's assets to be included
in the surviving spouse's gross estate
under Code § 2041 (and a release or
lapse of the power during the surviving spouse's life would trigger a taxable gift under Code § 2514 to the
extent not saved by the "five-and-five"
exception in Code § 2514(e)). The criti-

cal question, therefore, is how to make
the credit shelter trust the surviving
spouse's grantor trust without relying
on Code § 678.
Lifetime QTIP Trust for the
Spouse Dying First
This can be achieved through the use
of a lifetime QTIP trust. To illustrate,
assume the wife creates a lifetime QTIP
trust for her husband with sufficient
assets to use his entire estate tax
exemption when he dies. She elects
QTIP treatment for the trust on her U.S.
Gift (and Generation-Skipping
Transfer) Tax Return (Form 709). (Note
that it will not qualify for the marital
deduction if the spouse for whom the
QTIP is created is not a U.S. citizen. See
Code § 2523(i).) Thus, no gift tax is
payable when the trust is created, and
the entire trust will be included in the
gross estate of the husband when he
dies under Code § 2044. While both
spouses are alive, the trust is the wife's
grantor trust (assuming her husband is
a beneficiary for both trust income and
principal, the trust is deemed wholly
owned by the wife). See Code §§ 676,
677. Therefore, all of the trust's income
(whether allocated to accounting
income or to principal) would be taxed
to the wife without regard to the DNI
rules.
On the husband's death, as indicated, the assets in the lifetime QTIP trust
created by the wife for the husband are
included in his gross estate under Code
§ 2044. But estate tax will be avoided to
the extent of his remaining federal
estate tax exemption (and for the entire
trust if any assets in excess of the husband's remaining exemption pass in a
form that qualifies for the marital
deduction for estate tax purposes in his
estate). And, assuming the trust is
properly drafted, its assets (to the
extent of the husband's estate tax
exemption) should not be included in
the wife's gross estate at her later
death. Even though she may be a permissible (or even mandatory) beneficiary of the credit shelter trust created
from the lifetime QTP trust, it will not
be included in her gross estate as long
as she does not have a general power
of appointment and as long as the hus-

band's executor does not make a QTIP
election. Although, under Code § 2036,
trust assets may ordinarily be included
in the grantor's gross estate when the
grantor is a beneficiary, the QTIP regulations explicitly preclude the IRS from
invoking Code § 2036 or Code § 2038
in the surviving spouse's estate in the
case of such a lifetime QTIP. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2523(f)-1(f), ex. 11. Thus, even
if the credit shelter trust is drafted to
permit distributions to the wife, it will
not be included in her gross estate. In
effect, the trust functions exactly as
would a credit shelter trust formed
from assets in the husband's own
estate: a trust using his exemption
would be excluded from the wife's
gross estate at her later death.
Nonetheless, for income tax purposes, the trust can continue to be
treated as the wife's grantor trust after
the husband's death, provided the
trustee has discretion to make distributions of income and principal to the
wife. Regardless of the way in which
the trustee in fact exercises this discretion, the trust's taxable income will
continue to be attributed to the wife
under the grantor trust rules by reason
of the wife's discretionary interest in
trust income and principal. See Code
§§ 676, 677. Most critically, the wife is
viewed as remaining the grantor of the
trust for income tax purposes-thus
triggering Code § 676 and/or Code
§ 677-even though, at her husband's
death, it was included in his gross
estate under Code § 2044. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.671-2(e)(5) (no change in identity of the grantor unless someone exercises a general power of appointment
over the trust). As a result, the wife's
payment of the tax on the trust's
income does not constitute a taxable
gift. See Rev. Rul. 2004-64, supra. Thus,
even assuming the trustee accumulates
the income or distributes it to the
descendants, the wife is required to
pay the income tax and is not treated
as making a taxable gift when she does
so. In short, the credit shelter trust is
supercharged. And if GST exemption is
allocated to the lifetime QTIP trust as is
permitted in Treas. Reg. § 26.2632l(c)(2)(ii)(C) and as explained in J.
Blattmachr, Selected Planningand

DraftingAspects of Generation-Skipping
Transfer Taxation, Chase Rev. (Spring
1996), the transfer tax savings will be
further enhanced (although Rev. Rul.
2004-64 does not make explicit reference to the GST, its conclusion that no
taxable gift occurs by reason of the
grantor's payment of the income tax
should likewise apply for GST purposes; see Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-1).
It is appropriate parenthetically to
discuss the allocation of GST exemption in a bit more detail here. As
explained in the Chase Review article
cited above, the spouse who creates the
lifetime QTIP trust may make the socalled reverse QTIP election under
Code § 2652(a)(3) when the lifetime
QTIP trust is created. In other words,
the GST exemption of the first spouse
to die will not be allocated to the credit
shelter trust formed from that lifetime
QTIP trust. Rather, the GST exemption
of the spouse who created it will be
allocated and allocated earlier in time
than will the estate tax exemption of
the spouse dying first. An example
may help illustrate this concept. It is
quite certain the husband will die
before the wife will. She creates a $2
million lifetime QTIP trust for him.
Although she makes the QTIP election
to make the trust qualify for the gift tax
marital deduction under Code
§ 2523(f), she "reverses" that election
under Code § 2652(a)(3) for GST tax
purposes. Hence, her GST exemption
begins to "work" as soon as she creates
the trust. Assume that when the husband dies, the lifetime QTIP trust is
worth $3 million. The first $2 million
goes into a credit shelter trust for the
surviving spouse and is GST exempt
by reason of her allocation of her GST
exemption to the trust. The extra $1
million in the lifetime QTP trust the
wife created for the husband goes into
a QTIP trust for her, which the husband's executor will elect to qualify for
the estate tax marital deduction under
Code § 2056(b)(7). And it too will be
GST exempt, again by reason of the
wife's allocation of GST exemption to
the lifetime QTIP trust when she created it. The husband's GST exemption
will be allocated to other assets in his
estate-these other assets presumably
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will pass into a so-called reverse QTIP
trust for the wife. Hence, this strategy
not only supercharges the estate tax
exemption of the spouse who dies first
but, as explained in the Chase Review
article, "extra" supercharges the GST
exemption of the surviving spouse. Of
course, as with all lifetime uses of tax
exemptions, there is a risk that exemption is wasted if the assets decline in
value. If, in the foregoing example, the
assets decline to $1.5 million, the husband's estate tax exemption will
remain intact, but a portion of the
wife's GST exemption may be wasted.
Creditors' Rights Doctrine
Under the law of most, but not all,
states, a grantor's creditors may attach
assets in a trust the grantor has created
and from which he or she is entitled or
eligible in the discretion of a trustee to
receive distributions. See, e.g., N.Y. Est.
Powers & Trusts Law § 7-3.1;
Restatement (3d) of Trusts §§ 57-60. The
question becomes whether estate tax
inclusion in the estate of the spouse
who created the QTIP that becomes a
credit shelter trust for that spouse
might result if, under state law, her
creditors could reach the trust's assets.
Because the wife in the above example is the grantor of the lifetime QTIP
trust and also will be a permissible
beneficiary of the resulting credit shelter trust, it is at least arguable that,
under state law, her creditors could
attach the trust's assets. Ordinarily, the
ability of a grantor's creditors to reach
trust assets triggers inclusion in the
gross estate under Code § 2036. See,
e.g., Outwin v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.
153 (1981), acq. 1981-2 C.B. 1; Palozzi v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C. 182 (1954), acq.
1962-1 C.B 4; Estate of Paxton v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 785 (1986); Rev.
Rul. 77-378,1977-2 C.B. 348. As indicated, however, the QTIP regulations
explicitly preclude the IRS from invoking Code §§ 2036 and 2038 in this context. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(f)-1(f), ex.
11 (foreclosing the application of Code
§§ 2036 and 2038 in the surviving
spouse's gross estate for a QTIP trust
previously included in the other
spouse's gross estate under Code
§ 2044).
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Is it nonetheless possible that the
IRS could successfully argue that,
because of the right of the wife's creditors to reach the trust's assets, she has a
general power of appointment triggering inclusion in her estate under Code
§ 2041? Although the QTIP regulations
render Code §§ 2036 and 2038 inapplicable in the wife's estate, they do not
rule out the possible application of
Code § 2041. Although Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2041-1(b)(2) may be read to say
that the transferor of property cannot
be deemed to hold a general power of
appointment under Code § 2041, it is
appropriate to mention that the QTIP
rules make the spouse who is the beneficiary of a lifetime QTIP trust the
transferor of the trust property for
estate and gift tax purposes once the
trust is created. Example 11 to Treas.
Reg. § 25.2523(f)-1(f) says: "S [the
spouse for whom the lifetime QTIP
trust was created] is treated as the
transferor of the property." In addition,
that is consistent with Code § 2044(c)
("For purposes of this chapter ....
property includible in the gross estate
under subsection (a) shall be treated as
property passing from the decedent").
So if the spouse for whom the QTIP
trust was created is the transferor for
estate and gift tax purposes, it seems
completely logical that that spouse
could "create" a general power of
appointment for the grantor spouse.
For example, a wife creates a lifetime
QTIP trust for her husband and gives
him a testamentary special power of
appointment. When he dies, the trust is
included in his estate under Code
§ 2044 and he exercises his special
power of appointment to grant his
wife a general power of appointment.
It seems virtually certain the trust will
be in the wife's estate under Code
§ 2041, even though she was the creator of the QTIP The same result
should obtain (that is, inclusion in the
wife's gross estate) if she structured the
lifetime QTIP trust to grant herself a
general power of appointment on her
husband's death because the husband
would nevertheless, by reason of the
application of Code § 2044, have
become the transferor before the existence of the wife's general power of

appointment. Hence, if under applicable
state law, the wife's creditors could reach
the assets of the credit shelter trust, Code
§ 2041 could apply in her estate and would
make this strategy unworkable because it
would cause the credit shelter trust to be
included in her gross estate. It is critical, in
other words, that the plan be structured so
that Code § 2041 cannot apply in the wife's
estate to the credit shelter trust for her benefit formed out of the lifetime QTIP trust she
created for her husband.
This can be accomplished in one of two
ways. First, Code § 2041 can be negated
through the use of an ascertainable standard relating to health, education, maintenance, or support. For example, if distributions from the credit shelter trust to the
wife were limited by such a standard, Code
§ 2041 could not apply in her estate even if
her creditors could access the trust's assets
under state law. In those states permitting
creditors access, creditors will typically
only be able to reach the amount that the
trustee could distribute to the grantor
under a maximum exercise of discretion.
See, e.g., Vanderbilt Creditor Corp. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, NA, 473 N.Y.S.2d 242
(App. Div. 1984); comment f to Restatement
(3d) of Trusts § 60. Thus, in such jurisdictions, if the trustee can make distributions
only to the extent necessary for the
grantor's health, education, maintenance,
and support, the grantor's creditors are
similarly limited. They can reach the trust's
assets only to the extent the trustee could
properly make payments to the grantor for
such purposes. And because Code § 2041
excludes from the definition of a general
power of appointment a right to property
circumscribed by such a standard, including an appropriate standard in the instrument would preclude the IRS from invoking Code § 2041, even if the trust were
located in a state permitting creditors
access. (Further limitations also might be
incorporated, such as requiring the trustee
to consider other resources before making
distributions.) Practitioners should carefully check applicable state law to ensure that
creditors of the grantor would be so limited in their access to the trust property.
Second, the trust could be formed under
the laws of a state that does not permit the
grantor's creditors to access trust assets.
When the law of such a state controls
(Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Rhode Island,

South Dakota, Utah, and, to a limited
extent, Oklahoma), it will be respected
for federal estate tax purposes. See, e.g.,
Estate of German v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl.
641 (1985) (no estate tax inclusion in
estate of grantor who was eligible to
receive income and corpus from the
trust because her creditors could not
attach the trust property under the law
under which the trust was created); see
also Rev. Rul. 2004-64.
In sum, when using a Supercharged
Credit Shelter TrustsM, it is critical to
(1) include an appropriate standard in
the instrument and/or (2) locate the trust
in a state where the grantor's creditors
cannot reach trust assets. Failure to do so
could potentially result in inclusion of
the trust in the surviving spouse's estate.
If the suggested approach is used, the
lifetime QTIP trust becomes a credit shelter trust for the first spouse to die for
transfer tax purposes while remaining
the surviving spouse's grantor trust for
income tax purposes, thereby permitting the credit shelter trust to appreciate
on an income tax free basis. Given the
substantial amount of additional wealth
that can be transferred tax free with the
supercharged version of the credit shelter trust (see the table on page 58),
practitioners should give the approach
serious consideration in all cases in
which the spouses are willing to consider committing assets to a lifetime trust
arrangement.
Reciprocal Lifetime QTIP
Trusts: Estate Tax
Under the proposal, instead of creating
testamentary credit shelter trusts under
the wills or revocable trusts of both
spouses, each spouse creates a lifetime
QTIIP for the benefit of the other, with
sufficient assets in each trust fully to use
the beneficiary-spouse's exemption. This,
of course, raises the question whether
the "reciprocal trust doctrine" will
undermine the effectiveness of the
strategy.
In United States v. Estate of Grace, 395
U.S. 316 (1969), the Supreme Court
applied the doctrine to the following
facts. A husband had created a trust
under which the wife was entitled to
receive the income for life; the wife was
given a special power of appointment

exercisable in favor of their descendants and the husband. Fifteen days
later, the wife created a similar trust
containing the same dispositive provisions for the benefit of the husband.
Emphasizing the fact that the trusts
were identical and created in the same
time frame, the Court held that, at the
husband's death, the trust created by
the wife should be included in his
gross estate under an earlier version of
Code § 2036. Although a trust created
for the benefit of the decedent by
another party is not includible in the
decedent's estate under Code § 2036,
the Court nonetheless invoked the section on the theory that, in substance,
the husband was the grantor of the
trust nominally created by the wife. In
other words, the husband, in substance, created the trust under which
he was the income beneficiary. And,
under Code § 2036(a)(1), a trust is
included in the estate of the grantor if
the grantor retained the right to the
income for life. It is important to note
that, had the Court respected the form
of the transaction, neither trust would
have been subject to estate tax: the trust
created by the husband could not be
included in his estate because he did
not retain the right to its income, and it
could not be included in the wife's
estate because, although she had the
right to the income, she was not the
grantor (under a parallel analysis, the
trusts created by the wife would similarly be excluded from both estates).
For a further discussion of Grace and
the reciprocal trust doctrine, see
G. Slade, The Evolution of the Reciprocal
Trust Doctrine Since Grace and Its
CurrentApplication in Estate Planning,
17 Tax Mgmt. Est. Gifts & Tr. J. 71
(1992).
At first blush, it would seem that the
reciprocal trust doctrine should apply
when husband and wife simultaneously create lifetime QTIP trusts for each
other. Indeed, the case for applying
Code § 2036 in this context may not
even depend on the applicability of the
doctrine. For if the surviving spouse is
entitled to receive income from the
trust he or she created after the death

of the other spouse, the section applies
without regard to the doctrine. See
Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1 (applying the
section when the grantor retains the
right to the income after the income
interest given to another person terminates). On closer analysis, however,
Code § 2036 cannot apply in the QTIP
context, whether based on the reciprocal trust doctrine or otherwise. As indicated, the QTIP regulations preclude
the IRS from invoking Code § 2036 in
the surviving spouse's estate. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2523(0-1(f), ex. 11. Thus, the
doctrine cannot be used for the purpose of including a QTIP trust created
by the surviving spouse in his or her
estate. Indeed, given the QTIP regulations, the doctrine is entirely irrelevant
for estate tax purposes in the case of
simultaneously created QTIP trusts. It
would appear, moreover, to be irrelevant in this context for a second, independent reason: whereas, in Grace, neither trust would have been subject to
estate tax had the form been respected,
Code § 2044 requires that each QTIP
trust be included in the estate of the
beneficiary-spouse. Thus, unlike in
Grace, there is no need to disregard the
form to prevent a problematic estate
tax outcome. For an argument that the
doctrine cannot apply when the trust
will otherwise be included in the estate
of one of the spouses, see R. Covey,
PracticalDrafting,Oct. 1993, at 3402.
There is at least one other reason
why the reciprocal trust doctrine may
not apply. The "uncrossing" of the lifetime QTIP trusts is unimportant in and
of itself as far as estate tax inclusion is
concerned as one of those trusts will be
included in the gross estate of the first
spouse to die (under Code § 2044, if the
doctrine does not apply, and under
Code § 2036(a)(1), if it does) and the
other in the estate of the surviving
spouse (also under one of those sections), as discussed above. The real
issue is whether the application of the
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Amount in Credit Shelter Trust at Death of Surviving Spouse
Assumptions: $2 million initial funding; 8% annual return; 25% effective
income tax on undistributed income; amount in trust (in millions).
Years Between
Deaths of Spouses

Payment to Spouse
Each Year @ 4%

No Payment to Spouse
(Spouse Not Taxed)

No Payment to Spouse
(Spouse Pays Income Tax)

5

$2.32

$2.68

$2.94

10

2.69

3.58

4.32

15

3.12

4.79

6.34

20

3.61

6.41

9.32

25

4.19

8.58

doctrine would cause the credit shelter
trust to be included in the gross estate
of the surviving spouse. As indicated,
the doctrine applies only when there
are two trusts (which under the doctrine are "uncrossed"). Two credit shelter trusts would not be formed from
the lifetime QTIP trusts-only one.
And this trust, at least under general
tax principles, is a separate trust from
the lifetime QTIP trust that precedes it.
Because there is only one credit shelter
trust, there is nothing for it to be reciprocal to. Moreover, as explained above,
the credit shelter trust, in fact, is created
by the surviving spouse, raising the
possibility of estate tax inclusion under
Code § 2041 on account of the creditors' rights doctrine (which is
"blocked" by limiting distributions to
that spouse under an ascertainable
standard). If the doctrine applies to the
lifetime QTIP trusts and also to the successor credit shelter trust from the lifetime QTLP trust, then the surviving
spouse is not treated, for estate tax purposes, as creating the credit shelter
trust-rather, the credit shelter trust
will be treated as created by the spouse
dying first-and that, of course, should
totally foreclose the possibility of estate
tax inclusion (although, as discussed
below, it could destroy the "supercharged" aspect of the arrangement if
the doctrine were applied for grantor
trust purposes as well).
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Reciprocal Lifetime QTIP
Trusts: Gift Tax
The gift tax analysis is, however, different. If the QTIP trusts are not drafted
properly, the reciprocal trust doctrine
could present a significant gift tax risk.
The IRS could apply the doctrine for
the purpose of arguing that the QTIP
election is invalid. Consider the QTIP
created by the husband, which requires
that income be paid to the wife for life.
If, as a matter of substance, the wife is
viewed as the grantor of the trust, the
election would presumably be disregarded: given the requirement that the
grantor's spouse be entitled to the
income for life, an election should not
be available when the income is
payable to the grantor. See T. Herbst,
Lifetime Funding of Reverse QTIP Trusts
Enhances GST Planning,32 Est. Plan. 28
(2005) (raising a question about the
applicability of the reciprocal trust doctrine in the context of lifetime QTIP
trusts simultaneously created for the
purpose of making an early allocation
of GST exemption via reverse QTIP
elections). And if the election is disregarded, a taxable gift equal to the entire
amount contributed to the trust could
result. The reason is the potential application of Code § 2702. That section provides, in general, that when a property
owner creates a trust in which he or
she has retained the right to income, he
or she is deemed to have made a gift of

13.7
the entire property contributed to the
trust because the retention of an
income interest may not be subtracted
from the value of the property transferred for gift tax purposes. Code
§ 2702, however, does not apply if the
transfer in trust is an incomplete gift in
its entirety for federal gift tax purposes.
Hence, to ensure that Code § 2702 cannot apply, the QTIP trusts should be
drafted to give the beneficiary-spouse
a special testamentary power of
appointment. That will render both the
income interest and the remainder
interest incomplete gifts. See Treas.
Reg. § 25.2511-2 (indicating that, when
the donor retains an income interest
and such a special power, the gift is
rendered incomplete). And, most
important, no adverse estate tax consequence would ensue: if the reciprocal
trust doctrine does not apply, then
Example 11 to Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(f)1(f) will foreclose the application of
either or both of Code §§ 2036 and
2038; on the other hand, if the QTUP
election proves to be invalid on the
basis of the reciprocal trust doctrine,
the trust actually created by his wife
but deemed under the reciprocal trust
doctrine as created by the husband for
his own benefit would still be included
in his estate but under Code § 2036
and/or Code § 2038 rather than under
Code § 2044 (with the trust for the benefit of the wife similarly included in

her estate on the same rationale rather
than under Code § 2044) and it would
still use his federal estate tax exemption
when he dies survived by his wife. Thus,
any gift tax risk that the doctrine poses is
easily negated by the special power of
appointment without a negative estate tax
consequence.
Reciprocal Trust Doctrine and
the Grantor Trust Rules
Although, as suggested, the reciprocal
trust doctrine should not create any estate
or gift tax threat, the question remains
whether it could lead to a problematic
denial of grantor trust status. The key to
the success of a Supercharged Credit
Shelter Trust M is that the QTIP created by
the surviving spouse constitutes that
spouse's grantor trust. Were this to prove
not to be the case by reason of the doctrine, the trust would not be supercharged. The income of the credit shelter
trust, in other words, would not be attributed to the surviving spouse under the
grantor trust rules. If, for example, the
wife survived and the husband were
viewed, in substance, as the grantor of the
QTIP (and the successor credit shelter
trust) she had created, its income would
not be attributed to her under the grantor
trust rules. As a result, if she were to pay
the tax generated by the credit shelter
trust's income, the payment would constitute a taxable gift. Before turning to the
question whether the doctrine can be
applied to deny the surviving spouse the
desired grantor trust status, it is important
to emphasize the absence of any downside risk: if the surviving spouse cannot
treat the trust as his or her grantor trust,
the only adverse consequence is that its
income will remain subject to the DNI
rules, which is, of course, the way in
which conventional credit shelter trusts
are taxed. Thus, if the strategy works, the
trust is supercharged; and if it does not, it
produces the same outcome as a conventional credit shelter trust. (If the surviving
spouse pays the income tax on the trust
income because she believes it is a grantor
trust for her, but it turns out not to be her
grantor trust, Rev. Rul. 2004-64 would not
apply to prevent those tax payments from
being gifts to the trust. But, if the surviving spouse's powers over the trust
include a power to veto distributions to

others during her lifetime and a testamentary special power of appointment,
those powers would render any gift
incomplete, although her powers
would cause the portion of the trust
attributable to those gifts made by her
tax payments to be added back into her
gross estate, which is the same result as
if she had not made the payments of
income tax.)
More important than the absence of
downside risk, it would seem that the
reciprocal trust doctrine should not
result in a failure in the desired grantor
trust status. The doctrine has been
applied in the context of the grantor
trust rules. See Krause v. Commissioner,
497 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'g 57
T.C. 890 (1972); see also PLR 8813039
(not precedent), applying the reciprocal
trust doctrine for grantor trust purposes, which caused the trusts created by a
husband and by a wife for each other
to be treated as self-settled grantor
trusts and thus qualified subchapter S
shareholders. The doctrine should not
be problematic, however, for lifetime
QTIP trusts for two reasons. First, both
QTIP trusts are grantor trusts; the only
question is whether the husband
should be treated as owning the trust
he created or the one created by his
wife (with a parallel question concerning the wife). This is to be distinguished from Krause,in which, absent
the doctrine, the IRS would have been
unable to characterize either trust as a
grantor trust (in Krause, the IRS sought
to tax the trust's income to one of the
spouses). Second, regulations issued in
2000 appear to have abandoned the
doctrine for grantor trust purposes.
Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2(e)(1) provides: a
"person who funds a trust with an
amount that is directly reimbursed to
such person within a reasonable period
of time and who makes no other transfers to the trust that constitute gratuitous transfers is not treated as an
owner of any portion of the trust
under" the grantor trust rules. Under
this regulation, the person who makes
the reimbursement is the trust's owner
for grantor trust purposes. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.671-2(e)(6), ex. 3. Thus, unless
the person who creates the trust
receives a "direct reimbursement," the

creator of the trust is treated as the
grantor for grantor trust purposes. In
the case of simultaneously created
QTIP trusts, no such direct reimbursement occurs. Assuming again that the
husband is the surviving spouse, he is
treated both before and after his wife's
death, under the regulation, as the
grantor of the QTLP he had created for
her benefit because she did not directly
reimburse him. At worst, she might be
viewed as having indirectly reimbursed him (by creating the QTIP for
his benefit). As a final observation
about the regulation, the seeming decision to abandon the doctrine in this
context-and thereby narrow the number of cases in which a trust is treated
as a grantor trust-is not surprising.
After all, at the time this regulation was
promulgated, the IRS had already
come to fully appreciate the fact that
the grantor trust provisions are more
helpful than harmful to taxpayers.
Lastly, even if the QThP trusts are
deemed reciprocal, it does not necessarily follow that the doctrine applies to
the credit shelter trust. Not only is the
credit shelter trust a separate and distinct trust created on the death of the
spouse first to die (and only one credit
shelter trust is created), but at that
point, there is no other grantor trust
that it could be reciprocal to because
the other grantor has died. Therefore, it
seems impossible, even if QTIP trusts
were treated as reciprocal for grantor
trust purposes, to find that the credit
shelter trust is reciprocal and thus not a
grantor trust for the surviving spouse
who created it.
Why Take Any Risk?
Although it seems reasonably clear that
simultaneously created QTIP trusts can
be used to create a Supercharged
Credit Shelter TrustsM and that the
reciprocal trust doctrine does not pose
any serious threat to this strategy, it is
probably prudent to draft the documents so that there is no risk of failure.
This can be accomplished in one of two
ways. First, if the remainder interests
are not identical, the doctrine may be
rendered inapplicable. In Levy v.
Commissioner,46 T.C.M. (CCH) 910
(1983), a husband and wife created
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trusts on the same day, giving each
other an income interest. One trust
gave the beneficiary-spouse a special
power of appointment, and the other
did not. As a result of this difference in
the terms of the trusts, the reciprocal
trust doctrine was not applied. In
reaching this result, the court referenced the following language in Grace:
"The reciprocal trust doctrine does not
purport to reach transfers in trust
which create different interests and
which change 'the effective position of
each party vis a vis the [transferred]
property .... ."' Indeed, perhaps, of
even greater importance, the IRS had
conceded that, if valid, the special
power of appointment in the wife prevented the two trusts from being interrelated and, therefore, subject to the
reciprocal trust doctrine. Although the
IRS contended that the provision creating the special power of appointment
was invalid under state law (New
Jersey) or otherwise worthless, the
court concluded otherwise. It should
be noted that the wife's power of
appointment was currently exercisable,
which is, of course, not permitted in a
QTIP trust. Nevertheless, Levy does
endorse the proposition that, when the
trusts have different terms, they are not
interrelated and are, therefore, not subject to the reciprocal trust doctrine. And
although it is arguable that the Tax
Court in Levy was wrong in insisting
that, under the doctrine, the terms
must be identical, see Estate of Green v.
United States, 68 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1995)
(Jones, J., dissenting), the IRS has
embraced Levy. See PLR 200426008 (not
precedent). Second, even assuming that
the terms of the two trusts are identical,
the doctrine should still not apply if
they are not created in the same time
frame. See Grace, 395 U.S. at 316
(emphasizing that the trusts were interrelated because of the parallel terms
and because created within a 15-day
period).
Thus, to eliminate any risk that the
strategy might fail, the trusts should be
created at two different points in time
(separated by months, not by days as
in Grace). In addition, they could be
drafted differently. So, for example, as
in Levy, one trust might contain a spe-
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cial power of appointment while the
other would not (although, as suggested, it may be preferable to include the
power in both trusts to negate any taxable gift should the IRS argue that the
QTIP election is invalid, but the power
could be exercisable in favor of different classes of appointees and, perhaps,
might be exercisable only with the consent of a non-adverse party). One trust
might provide that an invasion could
only be made after the spouse's other
resources are taken into account, while
the other might direct that the existence
of such resources is irrelevant. Other
differences might relate to the income
interest. For example, one lifetime
QTIP trust might incorporate a unitrust
approach but the other would preclude
the trustee from using this approach.
Also, having different trustees under
the two instruments may further help
block the application of the doctrine as
may funding each trust with different
assets and with different values. Given
Grace, and the Tax Court's application
of Grace in Levy, it would seem that
either a difference in timing or a difference in terms should suffice to eliminate the threat of the doctrine.
Nonetheless, cautious practitioners
may choose to vary both the timing
and the terms.

Lifetime QTIP Trusts and
Powers Retained by the
Grantor Spouse
As explained above, granting one but
only one of the spouses a power of
appointment over the successor
Supercharged Credit Shelter TrustsM
formed from the lifetime QTIP trust he
or she created may be sufficient to vitiate the application of the reciprocal
trust doctrine. See Levy, 46 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 910. As also mentioned, having each spouse retain a power of
appointment may prevent certain
adverse tax consequences from occurring. But could such a power cause the
lifetime QTIP trust to fail to qualify for
the gift tax marital deduction?
A nondeductible terminable interest
described in Code § 2523(b) may not
qualify for the gift tax marital deduction. An interest is a nondeductible terminable interest if the donee spouse's

interest is temporary (a life estate, for
example) and either, under Code
§ 2523(b)(1), after that spouse's interest
ends someone (including the donor
spouse) has an interest in the property or,
under Code § 2523(b)(2), the donor
spouse has a power to appoint the property. The provision contained in Code
§ 2523(b)(2) could be construed to mean
that a lifetime QTIP trust may not qualify
for the marital deduction if the grantor
spouse holds a power of appointment
over the property in the QTIP trust even
if that power is not exercisable or does
not take effect until the spouse for whom
the QTIP trust was created dies. But the
legislative history to the Revenue Act
of 1948 (which enacted the marital
deduction provisions including the terminable interest rule) suggests that Code
§ 2523(b)(2) may apply only if the power
of appointment the donor spouse holds
was granted to him or her by a third
party. See, e.g., Senate Finance
Committee Report to H.R. 4970, at 1254.
Note also that both Treas. Reg. § 20.20411(b)(2), as mentioned above, and Treas.
Reg. § 25.2514-1(b)(2) suggest that a person cannot create a power of appointment in himself or herself (perhaps reinforcing the notion that Code § 2523(b)(2)
can only apply to a power of appointment granted to the donor spouse by a
third party), although, as also mentioned
above, the spouse for whom the lifetime
QTIP trust becomes the transferor of the
QTIP property (and, therefore, could
grant a general power to the grantor
spouse) does not become the transferor
until he or she makes a transfer of an
income interest during life or until his or
her death. In any case, the QTIP regulations at Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(0-1(a)
expressly provide that if the donor
retains a power described in Code
§ 2523(b)(2), no marital deduction is
allowable. And that prohibition could
encompass a power exercisable only after
the donee spouse dies. But at least one
commentator has pointed out that makes
no sense. J. Pennell, Estate Tax Marital
Deduction,Tax Mgt. Portfolio No. 843,
n.542. Other commentators believe that a
lifetime QTIP trust may qualify for the
gift tax marital deduction even if the
grantor spouse holds a power to control
the disposition of the trust property pro-

vided the power cannot take effect until
the donee spouse for whom the QTIP was
created dies. See, e.g., R. Covey, Marital
Deduction and Credit Shelter Dispositions
and the Use of FormulaProvisions (United
States Trust Company of New York 1999),
at 184.
At least two private letter rulings permit the gift tax marital deduction in such
a case. PLR 200406004 and PLR 9437032.
Although private letter rulings may not,
under Code § 6110(f)(3), be cited as precedent, the foregoing rulings are consistent
with the legislative history to Code
§ 2523(f). H. Rep. No. 97-201 to the bill
that became the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 (which adopted the QTIP provisions) states, at 161, in part: "[T]he bill
permits the creation or retention of any
powers over all or a portion of the corpus,
provided all such powers are exercisable
only at or after the death of the spouse."
(This can at found at 1981-2 C.B. 378.) And
the so-called Blue Book, the General
Explanation of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, prepared by the
Professional Staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation (Dec. 29, 1981), at 235, states:
"The Act permits the creation or retention
of any powers exercisable in favor of any
person over all or a portion of the corpus,
provided all such powers are exercisable
only at or after the death of the spouse."
Even though, given this history, it is
very unlikely that the IRS would (or
could) change course and take the position that the grantor of a lifetime QTIP
may not retain a power of appointment
exercisable only after the donee spouse
dies, practitioners may want to consider
making any power of appointment
retained by the grantor of a lifetime QTIP
contingent on its having no effect on the
validity of the QTIP election or marital
deduction qualification. Here is a sample
provision to be added to the provisions of
any trust (such as the Supercharged
Credit Shelter TrustsM and any QTIP trust
created for the grantor spouse on the
death of the donee spouse for whom the
lifetime QTIP trust was created):
The balance of the property then
held in the Trust, upon the Grantor's
death, shall be disposed of as follows:
(a) to the extent but only to the extent
that the Grantor's holding a power to

direct the distribution of the balance
of the property does not or would
not cause any property transferred
by the Grantor to the Lifetime QTIP
Trust hereunder to fail to qualify, in
whole or in part, for the Federal gift
tax marital deduction pursuant to
Code Sec. 2523(0, such balance shall
be distributed to such persons out of
a class composed of my descendants
[modify the class description as
appropriate], on such terms as the
Grantor may appoint by a Will or
other signed writing that is
acknowledged by the Grantor
before a notary public specifically
referring to this power of appointment and delivered to the Trustee of
this Trust; or (b) if the Grantor has
no power of appointment because
the conditions of clause (a) of this
sentence are not satisfied, or, in
default of appointment, or insofar as
the appointment is not effective,
[specify alternative disposition such
as into per stirpital shares for
descendants].
Income Tax Basis Matters
When the spouse for whom the lifetime QTIP trust is created dies, the
trust will be included in his or her
estate under Code § 2044. The income
tax basis of property that is included
under Code § 2044 is changed to its
estate tax value under Code § 1014(a).
See Code § 1014(b)(10). Ordinarily, in
the case of a grantor trust, the grantor
is deemed to own the trust's assets. See
Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184. As a
consequence, one might question
whether the grantor-trust rules or Code
§ 1014(b)(10) should control. In other
words, if, as suggested, the trust is
treated as the grantor trust of the
grantor spouse, does Rev. Rul. 85-13
preclude any change in basis at the
death of the donee spouse on the theory that the assets were owned by the
grantor for income tax purposes at all
times? It would seem that the specific
provision in Code § 1014(b)(10) should
control. Indeed, in all lifetime QTIP
trusts, the trust is deemed the grantor
spouse's grantor trust. See Code § 677.
And Code § 1014(b)(10), in providing

for a basis adjustment in the case of all
QTlPs, clearly does not contemplate an
unstated exception for lifetime QTIPs.
The fact that the credit shelter trust
is supercharged-that is, that it
remains a grantor trust until the
grantor of the lifetime QTIP trust
dies--offers another potential benefit
for change in basis. In effect, unlike a
conventional credit shelter trust, a
Supercharged Credit Shelter TrustsM
creates an opportunity to change basis
under Code § 1014 at the surviving
spouse's death as well. Because the
credit shelter trust for the grantor
spouse is a grantor trust, before the
grantor spouse dies, he or she may
exchange, income tax free under Rev.
Rul. 85-13, high-basis assets (such as
cash) for low-basis assets in the trust.
The low-basis assets the grantor
receives from the trust will have their
bases changed to the extent provided
under Code § 1014(a); and the high
basis in the assets transferred into the
Supercharged Credit Shelter TrustsM
will carry over even after the grantor
spouse dies. That result cannot be
accomplished with traditional credit
shelter trusts. See also J. Blattmachr,
M. Gans & H. Jacobson, Income Tax
Effects of Termination of GrantorTrust
Status by Reason of the Grantor'sDeath,
97 J. Tax'n 149, at 154-59 (Sept. 2002).
More Drafting Tips
As explained at the beginning of this
article, the will or revocable trust of a
married person who wants to effectuate a "optimal" marital deduction
estate plan sets aside the amount sheltered by the unified credit into a credit
shelter trust and has the balance pass
in a form that will qualify for the marital deduction. That is normally accomplished either by a word formula that
defines the credit shelter (or estate tax
exemption) amount or, conversely, by a
word formula that defines the minimum amount necessary to qualify for a
marital deduction to reduce the federal
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Supercharged Credit Shelter Trust" Decision Tree

IsClient married to U.S. citizen?

Does Client want to increase amount ultimately passing
free of federal estate tax by reason
Yesof Spouse's federal
estate tax exemption?
Yes
IsClient willing to pay income tax on the income of the
credit shelter trust that will be created with Spouse's
federal estate tax exemption?

I

Yes

IsClient willing to limit distributions from the credit
shelter trust that will be created with Spouse's federal
estate tax exemption based upon Client's health,
maintenance, support, and education?
Yes
Is Client willing to permit income distributions to Spouse
from assets contributed to the lifetime QTIP trust for
Spouse to continue even inthe event of a divorce?

I
-

Client should consider creating a lifetime OTIP trust for
Client's Spouse that will become a Supercharged Credit
Shelter TrustsM upon the death of the Client's Spouse.

Client should consider
creating a lifetime OTIP
trust for Spouse that
will become a credit
shelter trust upon
Spouse's death (even if
it is not supercharged).

Client and Spouse should
both consider creating a
lifetime QTIP/
Supercharged Credit
ShelterTrustsM for each
other (see page 63 for
reciprocal trust issues).
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It probably is not appropriate for Client to create
a lifetime OTIP trust
unless Spouse is a U.S.
citizen and lifetime QTIP
trust will be used to
ensure full use of
Spouse's federal estate
tax exemption.

estate tax to its minimum. These word formulas almost always take into account
other assets that are included in the married person's estate and that use part or all
of the deceased spouse's estate tax exemption. Hence, by way of example, if the
spouse dying first owns property with
rights of survivorship with a sibling, the
credit shelter amount under the will or
revocable trust will be reduced to the
extent that joint property is included in the
spouse's estate. See Code § 2040. The word
formula in the will or revocable trust also
will take into account any property included in the spouse's estate under Code
§ 2044 (that is, a QTIP trust that has been
created for that spouse by his or her surviving spouse or a prior spouse) that does
not qualify for the estate tax marital or
charitable deduction on the beneficiary
spouse's death.
If supercharging the credit shelter trust
is desirable, such word formulas will help
achieve that goal by having the unified
credit of the spouse dying first applied to
the assets in the lifetime QTIP trust that
has been created for that spouse because
the lifetime QTIP will be a grantor trust for
the surviving spouse, as explained above.
But word formulas must be used to define
the credit shelter amount (or, conversely,
the minimum marital deduction) under
the lifetime QTP trust document as well
as in the deceased spouse's will or revocable trust. These definitions may be similar
to the word formulas used in a married
person's will or revocable trust but need to
be refined to exclude any word formula
definition dispositions in the will or revocable trust of the spouse who was the beneficiary of the lifetime QTIP trust. Here are
some examples of possible definitions to
use in the lifetime QTIP trust to have the
unified credit of the donee spouse who
was the beneficiary of the lifetime QTIP
trust used first under that document:
If the Grantor survives the Grantor's
spouse, the Trustee of the Lifetime QTIIP
trust shall transfer from the Lifetime
QTIP Trust a sum/fractional share
equal to the Grantor's spouse's Estate
Tax Exemption to the Trustee of the
Credit Shelter Trust under this
Agreement, to be disposed of under the
terms of that trust. The Grantor's
spouse's "Estate Tax Exemption" means

the largest amount (but not taking
into account any disposition made
under the Grantor's spouse's Will or
any revocable trust created by the
Grantor's spouse that purports to be
specifically based upon the use of
the amount of the Grantor's
spouse's remaining unified credit,
applicable exclusion amount, estate
tax exemption amount, or similar

tax-driven formula amount, including but not limited to pursuant to a
so-called optimum marital deduction disposition, unless the provisions of any such Will or revocable
trust expressly and by express reference supercede the provisions of this
Agreement providing for the creation of the Credit Shelter Trust) that
can pass to the Credit Shelter Trust

hereunder without increasing the
Federal estate tax in the Grantor's
spouse's estate. It is the Grantor's
intent by this provision for the
Grantor's spouse's available applicable exclusion amount to be first
used to fund the Credit Shelter Trust
hereunder before being used to fund
any disposition based upon the
Grantor's spouse's applicable exclu-

Avoiding Possible Applications of the Reciprocal Trust Doctrine If Each
Spouse Will Create a Lifetime QTIP Trust (LQT) That Will Become a
Supercharged Credit Shelter TrustsM I
Spouse's LQT for Client
Client's LOT for Spouse
1. Create aboutone year after Client's LQTfor
Spouse (with different assets with different
values and with different trustees)
Z Prohibit conversion of income interestto unitrust
3. No lifetime withdrawal power
4. Client has testamentary SPA among narrow
class (exercisable only with consent of
non-adverse party)

1.Create currently
2. Permit income interest to be converted to
unitrust'
3. Spouse may withdraw for HEMS'
4. Spouse has testamentary SPA, among broad
class (without anyone's consent)

Upon Death of First to Die of Client or Spouse

I
Supercharged Credit Shelter Trust

"

for Client'

1. Client can veto distributions to other
trust beneficiaries
2. No lifetime withdrawal power
3. Client has no lifetime SPA
4. Client has testamentary SPA among narrow
class (exercisable only with consent of
non-adverse party)

Balance in QTIP Trust for Client,
1. Prohibit conversion of income interest
to unitrust
2. No lifetime withdrawal power
3.Trustee distributions to Client limited by HEMS
standard
4. Client has testamentary SPA among narrow
class (exercisable only with consent of
non-adverse party)

I

Supercharged Credit Shelter Trust' for Spouse5

--.
oR

I.

1. Spouse can veto distributions to other
trust beneficiaries
2. Spouse may withdraw for HEMS 3
3. Spouse has lifetime SPA
4. Spouse has testamentary SPA among
broad class (without anyone's consent)

Balance in (QTIP Trust for Spouse'
1.Permit income interest to be converted
to unitrust2
2. Spouse may withdraw for HEMS 3
3. Trustee distributions to Spouse limited by
HEMS standard
4. Client has testamentary SPA among broad
class (without anyone's consent)

1.A strong argument can be made that the reciprocal trust doctrine should not apply at all. The structure suggested represents a conservative approach.
2. Condition on state law permitting such conversion.
3. HEMS means health, education, maintenance, and support. Consider whether right of withdrawal will allow Spouse's creditors to attach trust assets. If that is a concern, do not grant
the withdrawal power.
4. SPAmeans special power of appointment.
5. Note that upon the death of the first of Client and Spouse to die, only one Supercharged Credit Shelter Trust' will be created (limited to the unused estate tax exemption of whichever
of Client and Spouse dies first), which will be for the survivor of Client and Spouse, with any balance in the LQTpassing into a QTIP trust (or other form of marital deduction transfer) for
the survivor of Client and Spouse.
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sion amount under the Grantor's
spouse's Will or any rev'ocable trust
created by the Grantor'ssspouse;
provided, however, that the Will or
any revocable trust crea ted by the
Grantor's spouse does -ot contain
an express direction to he contrary
referring specifically tot this
Agreement and the Cre dit Shelter
Trust created hereunder
The definition raises an interesting
question: can the survivinggspouse
"steal" the unified credit (and GST
exemption) of his or her sp ouse? In
other words, by having th( grantor
spouse of the lifetime QTTIPtrust define
the credit shelter amount vvithout
regard to any credit shelter disposition
contained in his or her spo use's will or
revocable trust, will that foreclose the
spouse who is the benefici ary of the
lifetime QT]iP trust from ussing his or
her unified credit under his or her will
or revocable trust? Let's talke an example. John and Maria are m.arried but
have children from prior nnarriages.
Maria is likely to die beforieJohn. John
creates a lifetime QTIP trwstfor Maria
that will convert into a Sul ercharged
Credit Shelter Trust sM for h im when
Maria dies. John structures the lifetime
QTIP trust for Maria so thait the credit
shelter trust amount in the lifetime
QTIP trust is determined v ,ithout
regard to any disposition 1Maria makes
of it under her will or revo'cable trust.
Maria is willing to have arryamount in
her estate above her credit shelter
amount pass into a QTIP t rust for John
to postpone estate taxation until his
death, when the property inthat QTIP
trust will pass to her desce ndants. But
she wants to have the cred it shelter
amount pass to her descen dants when
she dies and her will so pr ovides. If her
will is structured so the creedit shelter
trust amount is defined by taking into
account all other dispositic)ns of assets
included in her gross estat e (such as

:
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property she jointly owns with her
brother or any QTIP trust included in
her estate under Code § 2044), her
desire to benefit her descendants with
her unified credit will fail: the unified
credit will be used first under the lifetime QTIP trust for John and ultimately
his descendants.
This suggests a need for careful
coordination between the lifetime QTIP
trust and the will or revocable trust of
the spouse who is the beneficiary of the
lifetime QTIP trust. For example, if
Maria is aware of the lifetime QTIP
trust John has created for her (and one
would think she would be) and its
terms (and one would hope she or her
counsel would be), then she can define
the credit shelter amount to pass to her
descendants under her will (or revocable trust) without taking into account
the disposition in the lifetime QTIIP
trust that otherwise would use up her
unified credit. In other words, there
will be a disposition equal to the credit
shelter amount in both the lifetime
QTLP trust and her will (or revocable
trust). That means there will be estate
tax. For example, if Maria dies in 2007
with her entire $2 million estate tax
exemption available, a $2 million credit
shelter trust will be created for John
(passing on his death to his descendants) under the lifetime QTIP trust he
created for Maria and a $2 million
bequest (also equal to Maria's unused
estate tax exemption) will be made
under Maria's will or revocable trust to
her descendants. Because neither of
these dispositions qualifies for the marital (or charitable) deduction, Maria
will have a $4 million taxable estate
and federal (and, perhaps, state) estate
tax will be payable. Who bears the burden of that tax? Unless Maria has
specifically directed otherwise, the burden of the federal tax will be borne,
under Code § 2207A, by the property
in the lifetime QTIP trust. (Code
§ 2207A directs that the marginal
increase in federal estate tax attributable to the inclusion under Code § 2044
in the decedent's estate of a QTIP trust
must be borne by the QTIP trust except
to the extent that the decedent in his or

her will, or a revocable trust, specifically
indicates an intent to waive the right of
recovery.) Hence, it is likely that John's
attempt to "steal" Maria's unified credit
will fail at least for federal estate tax. But
if Maria's estate is also subject to state
estate tax, that tax may not be borne
exclusively by the lifetime QTIP trust
unless state law provides otherwise (see,
e.g., N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law
§ 2-1.8(d)) or, perhaps, if Maria's will or
revocable trust so provides. The suggested language above would avoid the creation of two credit shelter trusts by permitting any creation of a credit shelter
trust under the donee spouse's will or
revocable trust that expressly provides
that it supercedes the creation of the credit
shelter trust under the lifetime QTIP to
control.
Presumably, in many cases, the
spouses will work together to allow a
Supercharged Credit Shelter Trust M to be
created for the surviving spouse. That
means a "standard" word formula will be
used in the will or revocable trust of the
spouse who was the beneficiary of the
lifetime QTIP trust so his or her unified
credit will be used under the will (or revocable trust) only to the extent there is
insufficient property in the lifetime QTIP
trust fully to use the unified credit.
Summary and Conclusions
Given the additional wealth the
Supercharged Credit Shelter Trust M provides for descendants, as compared to the
amount of wealth provided under a conventional credit shelter trust, it probably
should be considered in all cases in which
the spouses have sufficient net worth.
Although the reciprocal trust doctrine
may be perceived as posing a threat to the
viability of the strategy, with proper drafting it does not create any additional estate
or gift tax risk, it poses no downside risk
for income tax purposes, but, most important, the application of the doctrine may
be effectively avoided by varying the timing and provisions of the two trusts. Thus,
the strategy provides a sound means significantly to enhance the effectiveness of
the federal estate tax exemption of the
spouse dying first and, through reverse
QTIP elections for each lifetime QTIP trust
at the time each is created, the GST
exemptions of both spouses. 0
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